Why did Iran and the axis of resistance refrain from bombing the Dimona reactor while Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities?

Yemen

Yamanat

Adel Al-Sayaghi*

1. Introduction to the problem

The escalation of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation in the spring and summer of 2024-2025 – which led to the massive Israeli operation inside Iran in June 2025 – represented a major paradox: Israel targeted dozens of sites linked to Tehran’s nuclear and missile program, while no missile or drone attacks were recorded by Iran or its allies against the Israeli Dimona reactor, despite repeated threats from the leaders of the Axis of Resistance, led by the Secretary General. Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah. How can we explain this “non-action”? What is stopping Tehran and its allies from striking one of the most important symbols of Israeli nuclear deterrence?

2. The importance of Dimona in the deterrence equation

The reactor is located at the heart of Israel’s nuclear system, which is not officially declared. According to Western estimates, it is classified as producing plutonium used in an arsenal estimated at between 80 and 100 nuclear warheads. Removing it would raise the possibility of a radioactive leak and undermine the image of “absolute immunity” that Tel Aviv has promoted for decades. For this reason, Israel has made it a target with maximum deterrence sensitivity, surrounding it with layers of air defense (Hetz-3, David’s Sling and Iron Dome) and internal civil protection measures that make reaching it and causing catastrophic damage an almost impossible task without precise and dense missile capabilities at the same time.

3. Assessment of recent Israeli strikes against Iran

The Israeli attacks of April 2024, then “Operation Narnia/Rising Lion” in June 2025 embodied the Israeli doctrine of “preemptive strike”: destroying nuclear infrastructure before it reaches the “point of no return”. More than 250 drones and F-35I fighters participated in the bombings from Natanz to Isfahan and Kermanshah, integrating cyberattacks and GPS jamming. The declared objective: to extend the timetable for achieving nuclear weapons, and to weaken the capabilities of ballistic missiles supposed to carry this weapon in the future. The repetition and audacity of these operations reflect confidence in the Israeli Air Force’s ability to operate far from the borders, and implicit support from the United States, in exchange for the knowledge that Iran’s response will be “below the threshold.”

4. Balance between deterrence and asymmetry of capabilities

Iran and its axis have an abundance of ballistic missiles (up to 2,000 km) and suicide drones, but they lack the intelligence and air superiority needed to penetrate deep into the Negev and carry out a precise strike that disables the reactor. In contrast, the Israeli military has stacked interception platforms with dense radar coverage, as well as the possibility of an overwhelming conventional response against sensitive targets in Iran, Lebanon and Syria, and perhaps a tactical nuclear response if “sovereign nuclear sites” are subject to catastrophic attack. This deterrence equation explains that both parties avoid targeting the “core” of the adversary’s deterrence capacity, settling for “periodic” and limited strikes.

5. The environmental-human cost and political calculation

Any precise missile that hits the heart of Dimona could release radioactive material and endanger hundreds of thousands of people in the Negev and southern Jordan, potentially drawing widespread international condemnation. Iran is keen to present itself – especially after Khamenei’s fatwa banning nuclear weapons – as a “responsible” party that does not target civilian nuclear facilities, even among its opponents. On the other hand, Israel presents its strikes as being preventive and directed against military installations or “out of service” centrifuges, to avoid being accused of having committed a “Chernobyl in the Middle East”. This dimension of moral propaganda means that the decision to strike the Israeli reactor risks losing the “media war” to which the axis of resistance attaches increasing importance.

6. Messages from Tehran: threat without implementation

Since Nasrallah’s speech in 2016 and his return to the threat in 2017, Dimona has been used as a scare card to dissuade Israel from targeting Lebanon and Iran, not as a target it actually intends to strike. Propaganda videos released by Hezbollah military media showed “no red lines” slogans, but these are essentially psychological messages based on the concept of deterrence by suggestion. A media battle is less costly and more controllable than military action that could drag the region into global war.

7. The strategy of “responding in the squares” instead of “responding to Dimona”

After the Israeli attacks, Iran demonstrated that it preferred to respond with proxies in Yemen or Iraq, or with cyberattacks and the transfer of advanced weapons to Gaza and Lebanon, because these are tools that allow a controlled progression of escalation. Targeting oil tankers in the Arabian Sea, or launching drones on US bases in Syria, achieves the objective of “revenge” without crossing a red line that could trigger a confrontation with the United States and the Arab-Israeli “Abraham” alliance.

8. Legal and diplomatic calculations

Despite Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Tehran is still keen not to give the Security Council a pretext for new punitive resolutions. Hitting a civilian nuclear facility – even if Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty – would be construed as a blatant violation of the 1998 resolution issued in 2011 not to target nuclear facilities protected by a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Therefore, the Axis’s refraining from bombing Dimona keeps Iran within the margin of “acceptable victimization” internationally, while highlighting Israel as a party violating the rules by targeting nuclear facilities declared subject to the International Agency.

9. Conclusions and perspectives

The reluctance of Iran and Hezbollah to strike Dimona combines on several levels: (a) an asymmetric deterrence equation in which Iran prefers to maintain its missile capacity for bargaining purposes rather than gamble with its existence, (b) a technological and intelligence deficit which makes access to the reactor a high risk for a symbolic return which may be limited, (c) an enormous environmental, humanitarian and diplomatic cost which could cause Tehran to lose its remaining sympathy international, (d) the availability of less costly indirect response alternatives. This is closer to the concept of “shadow war”. On the other hand, recent Israeli operations show that Tel Aviv is prepared to test the ceiling of deterrence whenever the international environment – ​​notably US support – allows it. While Iranian voices are increasingly being raised in favor of a “symmetrical response” or even an “acceleration of the nuclear deterrence program”, not targeting Dimona so far does not mean the absence of danger for the future, but rather indicates that Tehran is managing its conflict within the framework of a precise scale of escalation, in which it realizes that a single bullet into the reactor can trigger the nuclear fire that all capitals fear.

* Yemeni writer and military policy researcher
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Sources and references (listed alphabetically)

1. The Wall Street Journal – “Operation Narnia” report, June 27, 2025.

2. Wikipedia (Israeli strikes against Iran in June 2025) – Details of targeted sites.

3. The Guardian – “Monday briefing: Four ways Iran could hit back…”, June 23, 2025.

4. Diplomat Magazine – “The Iranian-Israeli confrontation…”, October 8, 2024.

5. The Times of Israel – Statement by former Atomic Energy Authority head on Dimona security, 2017.

6. The Sun – Video of Hezbollah threat against Dimona, November 2024.

7. Jerusalem Post interview – Nasrallah: “No red lines”, February 2017.

8. Anadolu Agency – Speech by Nasrallah demanding the dismantling of the reactor, February 16, 2017.

9. Modern Diplomacy – “A Striking Complexity: The Israel-Iran War of 2025…”, June 23, 2025.

10. Institute for the Study of War – “Iran Updates (Oct. 7 War)”, January 2025.

Yemen