Secular Yemen is the solution and alternative to the sectarian state

Yemen

Yamanat

Adel Al-Sayaghi

In an Arab world shaken by waves of sectarian tensions, sectarian divisions and identity conflicts, secularism does not appear as a simple “idea” or an “intellectual position”, but rather as a historical necessity to build a modern civil state capable of welcoming diversity without sinking into the abyss of religious war.

In the modern era, this banner has been carried by a number of Arab thinkers, perhaps the most prominent of whom are Faraj Fouda and Sayyed Al-Qimni, who paid the price for their ideas with their lives and security, in the face of a strict religious state, often cloaked in Sunni or Shiite slogans, imploring the “sacred” to dominate the “political.” In a context like that of Yemen, the question of the possibility of overthrowing secularism becomes more than a simple intellectual hypothesis. Rather, it is a genuine challenge to a fragmented reality that bleeds due to conflicts of religion and identity.

First of all: Faraj Fouda and Sayed Al-Qimni: The symbols of reason in the face of holiness

Farag Foda (1945-1992) was an exceptional secular voice at a time when waves of political Islam were rising in Egypt and the Arab world. Foda wrote about the religious state and its dangers, criticizing the experiences of the Islamic caliphate presented as a “golden model”, emphasizing that it was nothing other than political authorities who wore the guise of religion to legitimize their oppression. In his book The Absent Truth, he clearly stated that “the religious state is the gateway to tyranny” and showed how religion was used to deify lawbreakers, criminalize thought, and silence critics.

Sayyed Al-Qimni, who died in 2021, took a more research and archeological path in his reading of Islamic history. He has written about the relationship between power and religion, as well as how religious groups emerged and developed, using the tools of historiography and anthropology to analyze the political emergence of Islam and religious movements. Al-Qimni insisted on rereading history not as a “sacred narrative”, but as critical material that must be deconstructed in order to understand religion as a social and historical phenomenon, and not as a closed supra-human system.

Both thinkers were not against religion, but rather against its political use. They were the supporters of a state of law and citizenship, where there is no superiority for a Muslim over a Christian, nor for a Sunni over a Shiite, nor for a man over a woman, except to the extent that he belongs to the State and not to the sect.

secondly: The strict religious state: Sunni or Shiite

Contrary to the secular proposition, the religious state positions itself as a closed entity that claims to represent the “divine will” and projects it onto legislation, politics and national identity. There is no difference here between a strict Sunni state, such as the Salafist project of certain groups, and a theocratic Shiite state, as embodied in Iran’s “jurist tutelage.” In both cases, it is necessary to legitimize power in the name of religion and declare the political opponent as an enemy of God, and not as a simple opponent.

The greatest danger of this model is that the religious state does not recognize the equality of citizens. Rather, it redefines citizens based on their proximity to “sectarian law.” In the strictly Sunni state the Shiite becomes suspicious, and in the strictly Shiite state the Sunni is seen as an agent or nasibi. The state is transformed into a sectarian apparatus, and the army, education, justice system and media become tools serving sectarian loyalty and not national affiliation.

Because this state sees itself as an extension of God’s will, it is not subject to criticism, does not recognize diversity, and views opposition not only as a political departure, but rather as “religious apostasy.” Thus, it persecutes intellectuals, criminalizes freedom of opinion and reproduces ignorance under the name of “zeal for religion”.

Third: Is it possible to overturn secularism in Yemen?

Yemen constitutes an exemplary case for understanding the conflict between the civil state and the strict religious state. Since the fall of the central state in 2014, Yemen has in fact been divided into regions controlled by sectarian forces – the Houthis on one side, and the Salafist or Muslim Brotherhood movements on the other – each of which presents its project as “absolute right” and betrays or declares the others infidels.

In this context, can secularism be applied in Yemen?

The complicated answer is: yes, but under conditions.
Secularism is not imposed on societies divided by force of arms and blood, but rather is built gradually through political reform, community education and the dismantling of the sectarian structure. In Yemen, secularism can be:

1. A national rescue mechanism: it is the only one that can achieve justice in matters of citizenship between Sunnis and Shiites, Zaidis and Shafiites, Muslims and Bahais, men and women.

2. A tool to dismantle the authority of groups: Because today’s armed groups are based on religious legitimacy which authorizes them to bear arms and appoint the “guardian”, the “emir” and the “leader”, while secularism transfers this authority to the people and to the ballot box.

3. Consensus Platform: In a diverse country like this, a sectarian or sectarian solution cannot succeed. Secularism is not the opposite of religion, but rather a regulatory framework that preserves everyone’s right to religion without imposing the supervision of a sect.

However, there are huge obstacles:

Religious groups control education and the media.

Disintegration of the state and absence of effective elites.

A culture of fear and infidelity which means that any call for secularism is presented as “hostility towards Islam”.

However, there is no other way. The longer the sectarian conflict lasts, the greater the certainty that the solution cannot come from within “political theology”, but rather from outside, that is, from a civil conception of the State, in which politics is a human affair and not an extension of heaven.

Fourth: Lessons learned from Faraj Fouda and Al-Qimni in the Yemeni context

What Fouda and Al-Qimni did in Egypt can inspire Yemeni intellectuals and youth. Both proved that thought is not a luxury but a resistance. They rejected totalitarian religious discourse and reopened closed questions. Today, Yemen is in dire need of thinkers who confront the traditional religious establishment and redefine the relationship between religion and state, and between religion and society.

Secularism does not mean erasing religion from life, but rather preventing its monopoly. In Yemen, this mission is not theoretical; But fateful. The religious state divided Yemen and made religion a tool to kill, and doctrine an identity card to kill based on identity. What is needed now is a rational discourse that speaks of a homeland, not a sect, a law, not a fatwa, and equality, not guardianship.

Finally:

Secularism is not a Western elitist project, but rather an Arab and mainly Yemeni right. The rupture and collapse that Yemen is experiencing today is the natural price of a strict religious state that rules in the name of “divine right” and judges all who disagree. If a national and civil project is not presented, the divide will persist and the circles of violence and hatred will widen.

Faraj Foda once said: “If we do not die defending our ideas, we will die living in the humiliation of those who oppose them.” »
As for Sayed Al-Qimni, he writes: “The truth is not measured by the number of those who reject it, but by the extent to which we need it to live with dignity. »

Yemen needs this truth today, before what remains of the dream of a homeland is destroyed.

Yemen