Yemen and Mossad “reports and sources”
Yemen
Yamanat
Adel Al-Sayaghi
1 – General presentation
The Mossad (Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks) is the most important external arm of the Israeli national security system, along with the Aman Army and the internal Shin Bet. Since its creation in 1949, it has worked directly under the supervision of the Prime Minister. The number of its executives is estimated at around 7,000 people and its budget is around 2.7 billion dollars per year, which gives it a logistical and human capacity equal to that of the largest agencies in the world. The covert nature of its structure gives Mossad great flexibility to deploy in hostile environments, relying on a network of local operatives and diplomatic and commercial cover known in Israel as a “battle between wars” policy that aims to anticipate threats beyond its borders.
2 – Operational structure and recruitment methods
Partially announced divisions include the “Tsomet” division for operational operatives, “Kaysaria” for special operations, which houses the “Kidon” unit for covert assassinations, as well as “Qesht” for electronic hacking and intrusion techniques. The Mossad adopts the formula of a “katcheh” (case officer) who manages several human resources in the target country. Recruitment operations are carried out by monitoring financial or ideological weaknesses or according to the “friends of friends” principle, then the element is managed via encrypted communication mechanisms or meetings in third-party capitals. This model reduces the risks associated with direct Israeli assets and holds the local client responsible for the final tactical phase.
3 – Working tools: from assassinations to cyberwar
The Mossad developed advanced experience with surgical strikes, the most famous of which were the capture of Adolf Eichmann (1960) and the assassinations of “Black September” leaders after Munich (1972), including the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel in 2010, where fake European passports and surveillance cameras were used to manage an 11-member team. In the digital domain, he contributed, in cooperation with the CIA, to the launch of the “Stuxnet” virus, which disabled approximately 1,000 Iranian centrifuges in 2010, after being introduced into the Natanz facility by human transport via a “Dutch agent” specially recruited for the mission. This series shows Mossad’s transition from classic operational engineering to a complex mix of human intelligence and cyberattacks.
4 – Harvest of operations against Iran (2020 – 2025)
After years of “shadow war”, in June 2025, the Israeli military launched a double operation, “Red Wedding” and “Operation Narnia”, targeting a group of Iranian military and nuclear leaders in a lightning strike based on extensive espionage preparation, and including the assassination of nine scientists inside their homes and the strike of air defense systems with the help of drones and field agents. This operation demonstrated that on-the-ground tactical information (sleeping locations, movement patterns) is still often collected in Iran through local recruits or cross-border smuggling networks, demonstrating the extent of penetration.
5 – Activities within the Arab and Turkish space
In the Arab world, the Dubai crime in 2010 is a precedent for Mossad daring to carry out public executions in a Gulf country, and it was followed by the revelation of the identities of elements who used British and Australian passports. In Turkey, in 2024, the government carried out two campaigns (“MOL” and “MOL 2”) that resulted in the arrest of dozens of people accused of spying for Israel and collecting information on Palestinians and Turks, with the confiscation of money and digital media showing Mossad’s use of local intermediaries and GPS tracking tools. This highlights the agency’s reliance on the cyber dimension alongside the human element, and suggests that the “unwitting participation” of Turkish technicians was crucial in some cases.
6 – Undeclared partnerships in the Gulf
Since 2016, intelligence cooperation with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has taken on an institutional character, culminating with a secret visit by Mossad Director David Barnea to Washington in the summer of 2023 to coordinate “normalization proposals” with Saudi Arabia and joint security issues, particularly vis-à-vis Iran. WikiLeaks documents and diplomatic cables confirmed that Israel politically supported the Saudi campaign in Yemen and provided information on Iranian arms smuggling routes through the Red Sea. This rapprochement gives the Mossad logistical points of convergence close to Bab al-Mandab and the coasts of al-Mahra and Hadhramaut, and offers a dual recruitment channel via security and commercial companies based in Dubai and Manama.
7 – Historical precedents of penetration in Yemen
Historically, the Mossad attempted to establish “eyes” on the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the early 1970s. In June 1971, officer Baruch Zaki Mizrahi was sent under the name “Ahmad Al-Sabbagh” to Aden, then to Sanaa and Hodeidah to draw maps of ports and coastal defense units, in preparation for a punitive strike after attacking an Israeli oil tanker. He was arrested by chance on May 26, 1972, when a Yemeni officer became suspicious of his frequent photographs of military sites, and the entire operation was exposed. This incident remained a painful lesson for the Mossad and demonstrated the sensitivity of the Yemeni environment towards foreigners, despite the political fragmentation that existed at that time.
8 – Indicators of recent activity in Yemen (2023-2025)
Local reports revealed coordinated bombings that destroyed five Houthi missile depots and drones on May 24, 2025 in and around Sanaa. Yemeni sources attributed the hack to “a cell secretly recruited from the group’s ranks” with funding and planning from Mossad, speaking of a state of alert and internal investigations by the Houthis to monitor collaborators. This is reinforced by what the “Yemen Monitor” published about the Mossad director’s call to strike the Iranian “octopus head” in response to the Houthi naval attacks, which suggests close monitoring of the Yemeni scene by intelligence.
9- Assessment of current vulnerability to penetration in Yemen
The success of any intelligence penetration depends on four factors:
1. Recruitment opportunity: The political division (the recognized government, the Transitional Council, the Houthis) creates an ideal environment to attract disgruntled elements or those eager for financial support.
2. Geographic access: A long coastline (more than 2,000 km) and secondary ports not strictly controlled facilitate the entry of equipment or the exit of information.
3. Regional framework: Coordination with Gulf agencies provides diplomatic cover, visas and front company activities, particularly in areas under the control of UAE-backed forces.
4. Buffers of Resistance: Despite this, the Houthis have a security apparatus that receives Iranian training and demonstrates greater effectiveness in monitoring suspicious activity, and tribal sense may prevent the agent from continuing in a closed environment unless he resides in the region.
Therefore, the probability of penetration is “medium-high” in the southern and eastern coastal governorates, where central influence is weaker, but it is “low-medium” in Sanaa and Saada, where internal control is stricter.
10 – Summary and recommendations
Facts have proven that Mossad has developed a hybrid model that combines human and cyber intelligence and “pre-attack” operations. His ability to build networks in politically divided environments, such as former Sudan and present-day Yemen, is a natural extension of his experience managing clients. However, Baruch Mizrahi’s experience and failed rescue reveal that the margin of safety in Yemen can quickly shrink when local and tribal agencies cooperate.
To limit the threat, it is necessary to: unify a national security database, strengthen control over small ports, create joint counter-espionage units between the Yemeni forces in conflict and raise community awareness of recruitment methods (immigration, scholarships, false contracts). Such measures are enough to increase the cost of penetration and reduce the spaces available to Mossad or any foreign agency seeking to exploit the Yemeni divide for broader regional interests.
Sources and conclusions
1. Mossad – Wikipedia
Includes estimates of headcount (approximately 7,000) and budget (approximately $2.73 billion)
2. Al Jazeera English Yemen Monitor
Report on Mossad official’s call to strike Iran in response to Houthi attacks
3. Reuters – Interception of missiles launched by the Houthis towards Israel
Israel claims to have responded to Yemeni missile after it hit Sanaa airport (May 2025)
4. Human Rights Watch – Israeli raids on Sanaa airport
Analysis of airport attacks and their humanitarian repercussions
5. Reuters – Israel’s defense spending for 2024
Data details war spending and its impact on the state budget
6. Al-Monitor – “May is the worst” of Houthi operations against Israel
The Houthis have announced the implementation of 22 military operations since the beginning
7. **Monitoring the conflict between Israel and the Houthis – BBC, Reuters, Al Jazeera (Wikipedia)**
A description of Israel’s naval and air attacks on Yemen’s ports and airport between May and June 2025
8. Al-Naba (AP) – Israeli raids on Al-Houthi after Tel Aviv airport attack
Raids injured and destroyed facilities in Hodeidah and Bajil
9. Politico – Israeli navy targets Hodeidah port
Israel’s first direct naval intervention against the Houthis in June 2025
10. Wall Street Journal – Israeli attack on Houthis and Gaza expands
On the ground, this includes Gaza and Bifaq for operations with the participation of the Israeli army against the Houthis
Yemen